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Abstract
There are many security systems to protect information resources, but we are still not free from possible successful attacks.
This study aims at being one step towards the proposal of an intrusion detection system (IDS) that faces those attacks not
previously seen (zero-day attacks), by studying the combination of clustering and neural visualization techniques. To do that,
MObile VIsualization Connectionist Agent-Based IDS (MOVICAB-IDS), previously proposed as a hybrid intelligent IDS
based on a visualization approach, is upgraded by adding clustering methods. One of the main drawbacks of MOVICAB-IDS
was its dependence on human processing; it could not automatically raise an alarm to warn about attacks. Additionally,
human users could fail to detect an intrusion even when visualized as an anomalous one. To overcome this limitation, present
work proposes the application of clustering techniques to provide automatic response to MOVICAB-IDS to quickly abort
intrusive actions while happening. To check the validity of the proposed clustering extension, it faces now an anomalous
situation related to the Simple Network Management Protocol: a community search. This attack to get the community string
(password guessing) is analysed by clustering and neural tools, individually and in conjunction. Through the experimental
stage, it is shown that the combination of clustering and neural projection improves the detection capability on a continuous
network flow.
Keywords: Network intrusion detection, exploratory projection pursuit, custering, k-means, automatic response, SNMP.
1 Introduction
The ever-changing nature of attack technologies and strategies is one of the most harmful issues
of attacks and intrusions, increasing the difficulty of protecting computer systems. It means that
new ways of attacking information systems and networks are being developed on a daily basis.
For that reason, among others, it is not only prevention tool but also intrusion detection systems
(IDS) [1–3] that have become an essential asset in addition to the computer security infrastructure of
most organizations. An IDS can roughly be defined as a tool designed to detect suspicious patterns
that may be related to a network or system attack, in the context of computer networks. Intrusion
detection (ID) is, therefore, a field that focuses on the identification of attempted or ongoing attacks.
MObile VIsualisation Connectionist Agent-Based IDS (MOVICAB-IDS) was proposed [4, 5] as
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activity to identify intrusive events. This hybrid intelligent IDS combined different Artificial Intelli-
gence (AI) paradigms to visualize network traffic for ID at packet level. Its main goal was to provide
security personnel with an intuitive and informative visualization of network traffic to ease intrusion
detection. This IDS was proposed according to the need for visual support for ID that was identified
in [6]: ‘visualisation tools need to be designed so that anomalies can be easily flagged for later
analysis by more experienced analysts’. The proposed MOVICAB-IDS then applied an unsuper-
vised neural projection model to extract interesting traffic dataset projections and to display them
through a mobile visualization interface. One of its main drawbacks was its dependence on human
processing; MOVICAB-IDS could not automatically raise an alarm to warn about attacks. Hence,
human supervision was required to identify the anomalous situations. Additionally, human users
could fail to detect an intrusion even when visualized as an anomalous one due to the limitations of
human beings when visually processing big amounts of data [7].
Among all the implemented network protocols, several can be considered highly dangerous in
terms of network security. That is the case of Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)[8, 9],
which was ranked as one of the top five most vulnerable services by CISCO [10]. Specially the two
first versions [8, 11] of this protocol that still are the most widely used at present time. SNMP attacks
were also listed by the SANS Institute as one of the top 10 most critical Internet security threats [12,
13]. Those were the reasons for MOVICAB-IDS to be focused on the anomalous situations related
to this protocol.
SNMP was oriented to manage nodes in the Internet community [8]. It is an application layer
protocol that supports the exchange of management information (operating system, version, routing
tables and default TTL) between network devices. SNMP offers the capability to poll networked
devices and monitor data such as utilization and errors. SNMP is also capable of changing the
configurations on the host, allowing the remote management of the network device. This protocol
enables network administrators to manage network performance and is used to control network
elements such as routers, bridges and switches. As a result, SNMP data are quite sensitive and
liable to potential attacks. Indeed, an attack based on this protocol may severely compromise system
security [14]. SNMP uses a community string for authentication from the client to the agent on the
managed device. The default community string that provides the monitoring or read capability is
often ‘public’. The default management or write community string is often ‘private’. These default
community strings allow an attacker to gain information about a device using the read community
string ‘public’, and the attacker can change a systems configuration using the write community string
‘private’. The opportunity for this exploit is increased because the SNMP agent is often installed on
a system by default without the administrator’s knowledge.
Community searches are attacks generated by a hacker sending SNMP queries to the same port
number of different hosts, and by using different strategies (brute force, dictionary, etc.) to guess
the SNMP community string. Once the community string has been obtained, all the information
stored in the Management Information Base (MIB) is available for the intruder. The unencrypted
community string can be seen as the SNMP password for versions 1 and 2. In fact, it is the only
SNMP authentication mechanism. As reported in [12] This eases SNMP intrusions, as intruders
can guess the community string with little effort.
To overcome the limitations of MOVICAB-IDS, present work proposes the application of clus-
tering techniques in conjunction with other mechanisms previously applied in MOVICAB-IDS.
Clustering is the unsupervised classification of patterns (observations, data items or feature vec-
tors) into groups (clusters). The clustering problem has been addressed in many contexts and by
researchers in many disciplines; this reflects its broad appeal and usefulness as one of the steps in
exploratory data analysis. The experimental study tries to know whether clustering could be more
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informative applied over the projected data rather than the original data captured from the network.
That is, present work focus on how the detection rate and alarm capabilities of MOVICAB-IDS
could be improved by clustering the traffic packets.
Clustering and neural visualization have been previously applied to the identification of different
anomalous situations (network scans and MIB transfer) related to the SNMP network protocol [15].
Based on results from this previous study, present work advances that by focussing on a new attack
situation related to SNMP: community string searches. Several well-known clustering techniques
are analysed, compared and combined with powerful neural visualization models to identify this
new kind of attacks.
1.1 Related previous work
Present work aims to provide automatic response to MOVICAB-IDS applying clustering methods,
that have been previously applied to ID: [16] proposes an alert aggregation method, clustering similar
alerts into a hyper alert based on category and feature similarity. From a similar perspective, [17]
proposes a two-stage clustering algorithm to analyse the spatial and temporal relation of the network
intrusion behaviours’ alert sequence. [18] describes a classification of network traces through
an improved nearest neighbour method, while [19] applies data mining algorithms for the same
purpose and the results of preformatted data are visually displayed. Finally [20] discusses on how
the clustering algorithm is applied to intrusion detection and analyses intrusion detection algorithm
based on clustering problems.
The above-mentioned studies apply clustering methods directly to raw network data, whereas
the proposed system applies clustering to previously projected data (processed by neural models).
Present work focuses on the upgrading of MOVICAB-IDS, to incorporate new facilities. It is now
required an enhanced visualization by combining projection and clustering results to ease traffic
analysis by security personnel. That is, both simple and accumulated segments are now processed
by neural projection and clustering techniques. By doing so, further information on the nature of
the packets travelling along the network could be compressed in the visualization. Additionally,
automatic response could be incorporated in MOVICAB-IDS to quickly abort intrusive actions
while happening.
The remaining sections of this study are structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the combination
of visualization and clustering techniques and describes the applied ones. Experimental setting and
results are presented in Section 3 while the conclusions of this study are discussed in Section 4.
2 Combining visualization and clustering
MOVICAB-IDS was based on the application of different AI paradigms to process the continuous
data flow of network traffic. To do so, MOVICAB-IDS splits massive traffic data into limited datasets
and visualizes them, thereby providing security personnel with an intuitive snapshot to monitor the
events taking place in the observed computer network. The following paradigms were combined
within MOVICAB-IDS:
• Multiagent system (MAS): some of the components are wrapped as deliberative agents capable
of learning and evolving with the environment [21].
• Case-based reasoning (CBR): some of the agents contained in the MAS are known as CBR-
BDI agents [22] because they integrate the Beliefs, Desires and Intentions (BDI) [23] model
and the CBR paradigm.
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• Artificial neural networks (ANNs): the connectionist approach fits the ID problem mainly
because it allows a system to learn, in an empirical way, the input-output relationship between
traffic data and its subsequent interpretation [24]. The previously described CBR-BDI agents
incorporate the Cooperative Maximum Likelihood Hebbian Learning (CMLHL) neural model
(described in Section 2.1) to generate projections of network traffic.
The combination of these paradigms allowed the user to benefit from certain properties of ANN
(generalization that allows the identification of previously unseen attacks), CBR (learning from past
experiences) and agents (reactivity, proactivity, sociability and intelligence), which greatly facilitates
the ID task.
The general framework for MOVICAB-IDS, to perform the tasks depicted in Figure 1, could be
described as follows:
• packets travelling through the network are intercepted by a capture device;
• traffic is coded by a set of features spanning a multidimensional vector space; and
• a projection model operates on feature vectors and yields as output a suitable representation
of the network traffic. The projection model clearly is the actual core of the overall IDS. That
module is designed to yield an effective and intuitive representation of network traffic, thus
providing a powerful tool for the security staff to visualize network traffic.
FIG. 1. MOVICAB-IDS task organization.
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PRE-PROCESSED DATA STREAM











FIG. 2. MOVICAB-IDS segmentation of pre-processed data.
To process the continuous flow of network traffic, MOVICAB-IDS split the pre-processed data
stream into simple and accumulated segments as depicted in Figure 2. These segments are defined
as follows:
• Equal simple segments (Sx): each simple segment contains all the packets with timestamps
between the initial and final time limits of the segment. There must be a time overlap between
each pair of consecutive simple segments because anomalous situations could conceivably take
place between simple segment Sx and Sx+1 (where Sx+1 is the next segment following Sx).
• Accumulated segments (Ax): each one of these segments contains several consecutive simple
ones. To avoid duplicated packets, time overlap is removed in accumulated segments.
One of the main reasons for such a partitioning was to present a long-term picture of the evolution
of network traffic to the network administrator, as it allows the visualization of attacks lasting longer
than the length of a simple segment. To avoid confusion on the part of the analyst, accumulated
segments were visualized at the same time. This prompted the network administrator to realize that
there is only one anomalous situation being visualized twice.
Present work focuses on the upgrading of the previously introduced framework, to incorporate
new facilities, as described below. The initial architecture of MOVICAB-IDS is extended to com-
bine clustering methods and projection models, as depicted in Figure 3. The following subsections
describe the different techniques that take part in the proposed solution. For the dimensionality
reduction as a projection method, CMLHL [25] is explained as it proved to be the most informative
one among many considered [5]. It is described in Section 2.1. On the other hand, to test clustering
performance some of the standard methods have been tested, namely: k-means and agglomerative
clustering, described in Section 2.2.
2.1 CMLHL
The standard statistical method of Exploratory Projection Pursuit (EPP) [26] provides a linear pro-
jection of a dataset, but it projects the data onto a set of basis vectors which best reveal the interesting
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FIG. 3. Clustering extension of MOVICAB-IDS.
structure in data; interestingness is usually defined in terms of how far the distribution is from the
Gaussian distribution.
One neural implementation of EPP is Maximum Likelihood Hebbian Learning (MLHL) [27, 28].
It identifies interestingness by maximizing the probability of the residuals under specific probability
density functions which are non-Gaussian.
One extended version of this model is the CMLHL [25] model. CMLHL is based on MLHL [27,
28] adding lateral connections [25, 29] which have been derived from the Rectified Gaussian Dis-
tribution [30]. The resultant net can find the independent factors of a dataset but does so in a way
that captures some type of global ordering in the dataset.
Considering an N -dimensional input vector (x), and an M -dimensional output vector (y), with
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2. Lateral activation passing:











Where: η is the learning rate, τ is the ‘strength’ of the lateral connections, b the bias parameter, p a
parameter related to the energy function [25, 27, 28] and A a symmetric matrix used to modify the
response to the data [25]. The effect of this matrix is based on the relation between the distances
separating the output neurons.
2.2 Clustering
Cluster analysis [31, 32], is the organization of a collection of data items or patterns (usually
represented as a vector of measurements, or a point in a multidimensional space) into clusters
based on similarity. Hence, patterns within a valid cluster are more similar to each other than they
are to a pattern belonging to a different cluster.
Pattern proximity is usually measured by a distance function defined on pairs of patterns. A variety
of distance measures are in use in the various communities [33, 34]. The clustering output can be
hard (allocates each pattern to a single cluster) or fuzzy (where each pattern has a variable degree of
membership in each of the output clusters). A fuzzy clustering can be converted to a hard clustering
by assigning each pattern to the cluster with the largest measure of membership.
There are different approaches to clustering data [31], but given the high number and the strong
diversity of the existent clustering methods, we have focused on the ones shown in Figure 4 based
on the suggestions in [31].
At the top level, there is a distinction between hierarchical and partitional approaches. Hierarchical
methods produce a nested series of partitions (illustrated on a dendrogram which is a tree diagram)
FIG. 4. Clustering methods used in this paper: one hierarchical (agglomerative) and other partitional
method (K-means).
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based on a similarity for merging or splitting clusters, while partitional methods identify the partition
that optimizes (usually locally) a clustering criterion. Hence, obtaining a hierarchy of clusters can
provide more flexibility than other methods. A partition of the data can be obtained from a hierarchy
by cutting the tree of clusters at certain level.
Hierarchical methods generally fall into two types:
1. Agglomerative: an agglomerative approach begins with each pattern in a distinct cluster, and
successively joins clusters together until a stopping criterion is satisfied or until a single cluster
is formed.
2. Divisive: a divisive method begins with all patterns in a single cluster and performs splitting
until a stopping criterion is met or every pattern is in a different cluster. This method is neither
applied nor discussed in this article.
Partitional clustering aims to directly obtain a single partition of the data instead of a clustering
structure, such as the dendrogram produced by a hierarchical technique. Many of these methods are
based on the iterative optimization of a criterion function that reflects the similarity between a new
data and the each of the initial patterns selected for a specific iteration. Partitional methods have
advantages in applications involving large datasets for which the construction of a dendrogram is
computationally prohibitive. The problem of these algorithms is the need of the number of desired
output clusters [31]. Exhaustive search over all the set of possible initial labeling for an optimum
output is clearly computationally prohibitive. Therefore, in practice, the algorithm is typically run
a number of times with different starting states, and the best configuration obtained from all of
the runs is used as the output clustering. Hence, we can meet different results depending on the
initial labelling chosen (usually random). Additional techniques for the grouping operation include
density-based [35], probabilistic [36], graph-theoretic [37] and mixture-resolving [31] clustering
methods, but they are not used in this article.
3 Experiments and results
The main idea behind this experimental study is 2-fold: on the one hand, it is aimed at discovering
whish simple clustering techniques can be successfully applied to the SNMP intrusion detection
problem. On the other hand, it tries to check whether clustering and projection could work in unison
to ease intrusion detection. Additionally, as previously stated, the experimental study tries to show
whether clustering could be more informative applied over the projected data rather than the original
data captured from the network. That is, the same data have been analysed for intrusion detection, in
two different ways, according to what is depicted in Figure 3. The two considered alternatives are:
clustering on projected (dimensionality-reduced) data, and clustering on original (five-dimensional)
data.
This section describes the dataset used for evaluating the proposed clustering methods and how they
were generated. The experimental settings and the obtained results are also detailed.
3.1 Datasets
Five features were extracted from the headers of packets travelling along the network to form the
dataset, and one more (the first one) was added to identify each single packet:
• Packet ID: sequential integer nonlinear.
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• Timestamp: the time difference in relation to the first captured packet. Sequential integer
nonlinear.
• Source Port: the port of the source host from where the packet is sent. Discrete integer values.
• Destination Port: the port of the destination host to where the packet is sent. Discrete integer
values.
• Size: total packet size (in bytes).
• Protocol ID: we have used values between 1 and 35 to identify the packet protocol. Discrete
integer values.
After initial experiments, it was decided to apply MOVICAB-IDS to the anomalous situations related
to SNMP. The Management Information Base (MIB) can be defined in broad terms as the database
used by SNMP to store information about the elements that it controls. Like a dictionary, an MIB
defines a textual name for a managed object and explains its meaning.
As previously stated, consideration should be given to SNMP from a security standpoint, due to its
very limited security mechanisms and the security sensitive data that is stored in the MIB. Attackers
can exploit these vulnerabilities in the SNMP for network reconnaissance and remote reconfiguration
or shut down of SNMP devices. Thus, MOVICAB-IDS focuses on the most commonly reported
types of attacks that target SNMP:
• SNMP network scan: three types of scans (or sweeps) have been defined: network scans, port
scans and their hybrid block scans [38]. Unlike other attacks, scans must use a real-source
IP address, because the results of the scan (open ports or responding IP addresses) must be
returned to the attacker [39]. A port scan (or sweep) may be defined as series of messages
sent to different port numbers to gain information on its activity status. These messages can
be sent by an external agent attempting to access a host to find out more about the network
services that this host is providing. So, a scan is an attempt to count the services running on a
machine (or a set of machines) by probing each port for a response, providing information on
where to probe for weaknesses. Thus, scanning generally precedes any further intrusive activity.
This work focuses on the identification of network scans, in which the same port (the SNMP
port) is the target for a number of computers in an IP address range. A network scan is one
of the most common techniques used to identify services that might then be accessed without
permission [40].
• MIB information transfer: this situation involves a transfer of some (or all the) information
contained in the SNMP MIB, generally through the Get command or similar primitives such as
GetBulk [41, 42]. This kind of transfer is potentially quite a dangerous situation because anybody
possessing some free tools, some basic SNMP knowledge and the community string (in SNMP
versions 1 and 2), will be able to access all sorts of interesting and sometimes useful information.
As specified by the Internet Activities Board, the SNMP is used to access MIB objects. Thus,
protecting a network from malicious MIB information transfer is crucial. However, the‘normal’
behaviour of a network may include queries to the MIB. This is a situation in which visualization-
based IDSs are quite useful; these situations may be visualized as anomalous by an IDS but
it is the responsibility of the network administrator to decide whether or not it constitutes an
intrusion.
• Community search: this attack is generated by a hacker sending SNMP queries to the same port
number of different hosts, and by using different strategies (brute force, dictionary, etc.) to guess
the SNMP community string. Once the community string has been obtained, all the information
stored in the MIB is available for the intruder. The unencrypted community string can be seen as
the SNMP password for versions 1 and 2. In fact, it is the only SNMP authentication mechanism.
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As reported in [12], this eases SNMP intrusions, as intruders can guess the community string
with little effort.
In addition to the previously mentioned SNMP situations, the analysed datasets contain a great
background of network traffic that may be considered as ‘normal’. Information about the pack-
ets was gathered from a middle-size university network. As used in previous experiments, further
details on the data can be found in [4, 5]. The first two attack situations previously introduced have
been already studied in previous work by the authors under the frame of the clustering extension
of MOVICAB-IDS [43]. The datasets studied in present work contain an additional, and hence
new for this clustering-extension, anomalous situation: community searches. Two different seg-
ments are analysed to check the validity of the proposed extension when identifying community
searches: dataset 1 contains simple segment of normal traffic and dataset 2 contains accumulated
segments.
The simple segment contains all the packets whose timestamp is between the segment initial and
final time limit. There is a slight time overlap between each pair of consecutive simple segments.
The main reason for overlapping simple segments is that anomalous situations could conceivably
take place between simple segment. In this case, it would be necessary to consider some packets
twice in order to visualize the end of the anomalous situation and the evolution between simple
segments. To prevent confusion of the analyst (e.g., the same anomalous situation is visualized in
two different simple segments), accumulated segments are visualized at the same time. Each one of
these segments contains several consecutive simple ones. This will lead the network administrator
to realize that there is only one anomalous situation being visualized twice. They can be described
as follows:
• Dataset 1: contains a simple segment of ‘normal’ traffic, two network scans that target port
numbers 1434 and 65,788, and three SNMP community searches that target port numbers 161,
1161 and 2161 of all the machines within an IP address range. Three different community
names were used for each one of these port numbers. In total, 3235 packets are contained in
this dataset.
• Dataset 2: contains an accumulated segment of ‘normal’ traffic, two network scans that target
port numbers 1434 and 65,788, and three community searches that target port numbers 161,
1161, 2161. Three different community names were used for each one of these port numbers.
In total, 8219 packets are contained in this dataset.
3.2 Details of applied clustering techniques
As similarity is fundamental to the definition of a cluster, a measure of the similarity is essential to
most clustering methods and it must be carefully chosen. Present study applies well-known distance
criteria used for examples whose features are all continuous.
The most popular metric for continuous features is the Euclidean distance which is a special case
of the Minkowski metric (p=2). It works well when a dataset has compact or isolated clusters [44].
The problem of using directly the Minkowski metrics is the tendency of the largest-scaled feature
to dominate the others. Solutions to this problem include normalization of the continuous features
(sEuclidean distance).
Linear correlation among features can also distort distance measures, it can be relieved by using
the squared Mahalanobis distance that assigns different weights to different features based on their
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TABLE 1. Some of the well-known distance measures that are usually employed in clustering methods
Metric Description
Euclidean Euclidean distance.
sEuclidean Standardized Euclidean distance. Each coordinate difference between rows is
scaled by dividing by the corresponding element of the standard deviation.
Cityblock City block metric also known as Manhattan distance.
Minkowski Minkowski distance.
Chebychev Chebychev distance (maximum coordinate difference).
Mahalanobis Mahalanobis distance, using the sample covariance.
Cosine One minus the cosine of the included angle between points (treated as vectors).
Correlation One minus the sample correlation between points (treated as sequences of values).
TABLE 2. Distance measures employed for K-means in this study
Metric Description
sqEuclidean Squared Euclidean distance. Each centroid is the mean of the points in
that cluster.
Cityblock Sum of absolute differences. Each centroid is the component-wise
median of the points in that cluster.
Cosine One minus the cosine of the included angle between points (treated as
vectors). Each centroid is the mean of the points in that cluster, after
normalizing those points to unit Euclidean length.
Correlation One minus the sample correlation between points (treated as sequences
of values). Each centroid is the component-wise mean of the points
in that cluster, after centering and normalizing those points to zero
mean and unit standard deviation.
variances and pairwise linear correlations. The regularized Mahalanobis distance was used in [44]
to extract hyperellipsoidal clusters.
3.2.1 K-Means algorithm
Four different distance measures are applied in present study for k-means algorithm, as described
in Table 2. The proposed solution has been tested on all of them and the best result can be seen on
Section 3.3.
3.2.2 Agglomerative clustering
Based on the way the proximity matrix is updated in the second phase, a variety of linking methods
can be designed (this study has been developed with the linking methods shown in Table 3).
Most hierarchical clustering algorithms are based on the single link and complete link.
These two algorithms differ in the way they characterize the similarity between a pair
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Ward Inner squared distance (minimum variance algorithm), appropriate for
Euclidean distances only.
Median Weighted centre of mass distance (WPGMC: Weighted Pair Group
Method with Centroid Averaging), appropriate for Euclidean
distances only.
Average Unweighted average distance (UPGMA: Unweighted Pair Group
Method with Arithmetic Averaging).
Centroid Centroid distance (UPGMC: Unweighted Pair Group Method with
Centroid Averaging), appropriate for Euclidean distances only.
Weighted Weighted average distance (WPGMA: Weighted Pair Group Method
with Arithmetic Averaging).
of clusters:
1. Single-link algorithm: the distance between two clusters is the minimum of the distances
between all pairs of patterns drawn from each of the clusters.
2. Complete-link algorithm: the distance between two clusters is the maximum of all pairwise
distances between patterns in each of the clusters.
In either case, two clusters are merged to form a larger cluster based on minimum distance criteria.
The complete-link algorithm produces compact clusters [45]. The single-link algorithm, by contrast,
suffers from a chaining effect. It has a tendency to produce clusters that are straggly or elongated.
The clusters obtained by the complete-link algorithm are more compact than those obtained by the
single-link algorithm. The single-link algorithm is more versatile than the complete-link algorithm.
However, it has been observed that the complete-link algorithm produces more useful hierarchies
in many applications than the single-link algorithm [31].
3.3 Results
The best results obtained by applying the previously introduced techniques to the described datasets
are shown in this section. The results are projected through CMLHL and further information about the
clustering results is added to the projections, mainly by the glyph metaphor (colours and symbols).
The projections comprise a legend that states the colour and symbol used to depict each packet,
according to the original category of the data.
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FIG. 5. Best clustering result under the frame of MOVICAB-IDS through k-means for Dataset 1.
(a) K-means on projected data: k =4, correlation distance. (b) K-means on original data: k =4,
correlation distance.
The clustering methods have been applied several times to the analysed datasets by combining
different values for the algorithm options. The following sections show the best results, whose
parameter settings and performance are also detailed. The following subsections comprise the results
obtained by the projection and clustering technique for each one of the datasets.
3.3.1 Dataset 1
Figure 5 shows the results obtained by k-means on this data. The data has been labelled as fol-
lows: normal traffic (Cat. 1), network scan that target port number 1434 (Cat. 2), network scan that
target port number 65788 (Cat. 3), community search that target port number 161 (Cat. 4), commu-
nity search that target port number 1161 (Cat. 5), community search that target port number 2161
(Cat. 6).
For the normal traffic on projected data (Cat. 1 in Fig. 5a), the clustering does not group data
without mistakes as it mixes all the anomalous situations, grouped in the same group (Clust. 3 in
Fig. 5a), with some of the normal traffic (Cat. 1 Clust. 3). For the original data, although the num-
ber of clusters (k parameter) is the same, data are more mixed, hence the clustering is worst. In
this case, most of the anomalous situations are grouped in the same group (Clust. 1), together with
some of the normal traffic (Cat. 1 Clust. 1), except the packets from the second network scan that
target port number 65,788 (Cat. 3 Clust. 2), that are grouped alone in cluster 2. Apart from these
two projections, some more experiments have been conducted, whose details: performance, false
positive rates (FPRs) and false negative rates (FNRs), values of k parameter, etc., can be seen in
Table 4.
The run experiments for the agglomerative method with very little FPR or no clustering error are
shown in Table 5.
It can be seen that, in the case of projected data, the minimum number of clusters with a very
little error is 4, while in the case of original data is 7 with appropriate distance method. In the case
of original data, the sEuclidean distance minimizes the number of clusters with very low error rate,
and in the case of projected data there are some other methods applicable providing a non-zero,
although very low, value of FPR.
The results of one of the best experiments from Table 5 are depicted in Figure 6, including traffic
visualization and the associated dendrogram on projected data. The chosen experiment details are:
correlation distance, weighted linkage, cutoff: 0.5 and 4 groups with FPR = 0.2479%.
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TABLE 4. k-Means experiments with different conditions for Dataset
Data k Distance criteria FPR (%) FNR (%) Replicates/Iterations Sum of
Iterations Distances
Projected 2 sqEuclidean 81.0201 0 5/5 6749.85
Original 2 sqEuclidean 37.7125 2.6892 5/7 2.60673E+13
Projected 4 sqEuclidean 00.5255 0 5/5 1936.62
Original 4 sqEuclidean 51.4684 0 5/17 6.37068E+12
Projected 6 sqEuclidean 0.5255 0 5/10 1157.53
Original 6 sqEuclidean 36.7542 0 5/34 3.18335E+12
Projected 2 Cityblock 67.2334 1.8547 5/3 4161.98
Original 2 Cityblock 32.2720 2.6892 5/5 2.82857E+08
Projected 4 Cityblock 0.6491 0 5/5 2341.34
Original 4 Cityblock 45.4714 0 5/6 1.48534E+08
Projected 6 Cityblock 0.6491 0 5/5 1883.25
Original 6 Cityblock 36.4452 0 5/29 1.05724E+08
Projected 2 Cosine 53.7249 1.8547 5/4 760.895
Original 2 Cosine 67.2952 1.8547 5/2 0.0373789
Projected 4 Cosine 0.7110 0 5/13 233.695
Original 4 Cosine 67.2952 0 5/12 0.00313724
Projected 6 Cosine 0.6801 0 5/13 74.5217
Original 6 Cosine 14.8995 0 5/10 0.00811161
Projected 2 Correlation 37.8362 0 5/3 727.484
Original 2 Correlation 67.2952 1.8547 5/2 0.0357083
Projected 4 Correlation 0.6491 0 5/10 169.474
Original 4 Correlation 14.8995 0 5/5 0.00769754
Projected 6 Correlation 0.6491 0 5/17 49.5901
Original 6 Correlation 14.8995 0 5/11 0.0025605
3.3.2 Dataset 2
Figure 7 shows the results obtained by k-means on this data. The data has been labelled as follows:
normal traffic (Cat. 1), network scan that target port number 1434 (Cat. 2), network scan that target
port number 65,788 (Cat. 3), community search that target port number 161 (Cat. 4), community
search that target port number 1161 (Cat. 5), community search that target port number 2161 (Cat. 6).
Although this dataset contains an accumulated segment with a great amount of packets, the number
of categories for attacks is not proportionally increased.
For the normal traffic on projected data (Cat. 1 in Fig. 7a), the clustering does not group data
without mistakes as it mixes most of the anomalous situations, grouped in the same group (Clust.
5 in Fig. 7a), with some of the normal traffic (Cat. 1 Clust. 5). For the original data, although the
number of clusters (k parameter) is the same, data are more mixed, hence the clustering is worst.
In this case, the two network scans are grouped in the same group (Clust. 6), together with some of
the normal traffic (Cat. 1 Clust. 6), and the three community searches are clustered together (Clust.
2) with some of normal traffic’s packets (Cat. 1 Clust. 2). Apart from these two projections, some
more experiments have been conducted, whose details (performance, FPR and FNR, values of k
parameter, etc.) can be seen in Table 6.
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TABLE 5. Experimental setting of the agglomerative method for Dataset 1
Data Distance Linkage Cutoff FPR (%) Cluster
Projected Euclidean Single 0.85 0.4637 11
Projected sEuclidean Average 2.5 0.5255 7
Projected Cityblock Single 1.25 0.4637 9
Projected Minkowski p=3 Single 1 0.4637 8
Projected Cosine Average 0.6 0.7110 5
Projected Cosine Weighted 0.7 0.7110 5
Projected Correlation Complete 0.8 0.6801 5
Projected Correlation Average 0.2 0.6491 7
Projected Correlation Weighted 0.5 0.6801 4
Original sEuclidean Average 3 0.6491 7
Original sEuclidean Weighted 3 0.6800 7
Original Cityblock Complete 150,000 22.4111 8
Original Mahalanobis Complete 5 0.5255 7
Original Mahalanobis Average 3 0.6491 8
(a)
(b)
FIG. 6. Best results of agglomerative clustering under the frame of MOVICAB-IDS for Dataset
1. (a) Agglomerative clustering on projected data: sEuclidean, linkage: average, cutoff: 2.5. (b)
Corresponding dendrogram.
The run experiments for the agglomerative method with very little FPR error are shown in Table 7.
It can be seen that in both cases (projected and original data), the minimum number of clusters
with very little error is 6, although, in the case of projected data, it is obtained with a wide range of
methods, while there is only one method (sEuclidean linkage complete) that can obtain that number
of clusters. For original data, the sEuclidean distance minimizes the number of clusters with very
low error rate, and in the case of projected data there are some other methods applicable providing
a non-zero, although very low, value of FPR.
The results of one of the best experiments from Table 7 are depicted in Figure 8 including traffic
visualization and the associated dendrogram on projected data. The chosen experiment details are:
Mahalanobis distance, weighted linkage, cutoff: 3 and 6 groups with FPR = 0.5719%.
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FIG. 7. Best clustering result under the frame of MOVICAB-IDS through k-means for Dataset 2.
(a) k-means on projected data: k =6, sqEuclidean distance. (b) k-means on original data: k =6,
sqEuclidean distance.
TABLE 6. k-means experiments with different conditions for Dataset 2
Data k Distance Criteria FPR (%) FNR (%) Replicates/ Sum of
Iterations distances
Projected 2 sqEuclidean 80.5873 0 5/5 6749.85
Original 2 sqEuclidean 56.3524 2.8748 5/8 2.60673E+13
Projected 4 sqEuclidean 53.4158 0 5/7 1936.62
Original 4 sqEuclidean 72.8594 0.0309 5/12 6.37068E+12
Projected 6 sqEuclidean 53.4158 0 5/9 1219.47
Original 6 sqEuclidean 78.3617 0.0309 5/25 3.18335E+12
Projected 2 Cityblock 71.0388 1.8547 5/4 4161.98
Original 2 Cityblock 61.7929 2.8748 5/6 2.82857E+08
Projected 4 Cityblock 72.0866 0 5/11 2610.15
Original 4 Cityblock 64.8841 0.1855 5/7 1.48534E+08
Projected 6 Cityblock 0.2164 0 5/18 1882.77
Original 6 Cityblock 77.9907 0.0309 5/26 1.05723E+08
Projected 2 Cosine 53.2921 1.8547 5/2 760.895
Original 2 Cosine 66.8624 1.8547 5/3 0.0373789
Projected 4 Cosine 0.2782 0 5/8 195.351
Original 4 Cosine 66.8624 0 5/7 0.00811376
Projected 6 Cosine 0.2473 0 5/14 74.5217
Original 6 Cosine 66.8623 0 5/9 0.00798351
Projected 2 Correlation 37.4343 0.0309 5/2 727.484
Original 2 Correlation 66.8624 1.8547 5/2 0.0357083
Projected 4 Correlation 13.8176 0 5/5 169.474
Original 4 Correlation 66.8624 0 5/2 0.00769754
Projected 6 Correlation 13.7249 0 5/12 49.5901
Original 6 Correlation 66.8624 0 5/8 0.00100529
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TABLE 7. Experimental setting of the agglomerative method for Dataset 2
Data Distance Linkage Cutoff FPR (%) Cluster
Projected Euclidean Complete 5 0.7179 6
Projected Euclidean Average 3 0.7179 6
Projected Euclidean Weighted 3 0.5719 6
Projected sEuclidean Complete 5 0.7179 6
Projected sEuclidean Average 5 0.7179 6
Projected sEuclidean Weighted 3 0.5719 6
Projected Cityblock Complete 5 0.5719 8
Projected Cityblock Average 5 0.7179 6
Projected Cityblock Weighted 5 0.5719 6
Projected Minkowski p=3 Average 4 0.7179 6
Projected Chebychev Weighted 3 0.7179 6
Projected Mahalanobis Weighted 3 0.5719 6
Projected Cosine Average 0.25 0.7178 6
Projected Cosine Weighted 0.45 0.9004 6
Original sEuclidean Complete 5 0.6692 6
Original sEuclidean Average 3 0.6692 9
Original sEuclidean Weighted 3 0.5719 9
Original Mahalanobis Complete 5 0.5719 8
Original Mahalanobis Average 4 0.7179 7
Original Mahalanobis Weighted 4 0.6692 9































FIG. 8. Best results of agglomerative clustering under the frame of MOVICAB-IDS for Dataset
2. (a) Agglomerative clustering on projected data: Mahalanobis, linkage: weighted, cutoff: 3. (b)
Corresponding dendrogram.
4 Conclusions
A clustering extension of MOVICAB-IDS has been proposed in present work as simple clustering
methods and has been applied to early stages of an SNMP attack: network scans and SNMP com-
munity searches. It is worth highlighting that community searches are analysed in combination with
these other anomalous situations, what makes its identification even more difficult.
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Detailed conclusions about experiments on the different datasets and with several different clus-
tering techniques and criteria, can be found in Section 3. Experimental results show that some of the
applied clustering methods obtain a good clustering performance on the analysed data, according
to FPR and FNR. The obtained results vary from the different analysed datasets and the behaviour
of the applied clustering techniques. These results are consistent with those previously obtained for
other SNMP anomalous situations [15].
Regarding the distance criteria, none of them is clearly the best one, so its selection will depend
on the analysed data. Finally, by considering projected versus original data, it can be said that the
results over projected data in the case of community searches are better (fewer number of groups
with the same FNR and FPR) and other advantage is the smaller execution time, what is not covered
in present work.
Finally, it can be concluded that the applied methods are able to properly detect anomalous
situations when projected together with normal traffic. It has been proved that clustering methods
could help in ID not only by applying them to the same data that is projected but in a subsequent way.
On the other hand, by clustering packets, automatic response could be added to MOVICAB-IDS, to
quickly abort intrusive actions while happening.
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